Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism. Both reflect on the relationships between multiple overlappin le al orders, and between "donors" and "recipients" in interactional legal practices.
These disciplines point to moments of problem-articulation, periods of translation, and practices of acceptance and recognition. The paper suggests preliminary conclusions about the distinctiveness of legal norms, specifically that there is an aesthetic to law reform or legal instrumentalism and to a practice of recognition between overlapping normative options, both of which generate a particular kind of fidelity to law and legal norms.
The paper is an initial attempt to work through three broad themes that will ground a larger project. The first is to bridge international and domestic domains as sites of interaction by focusing on the transnational movement of law and legal transplants. Cotterrell aptly writes:
To invoke an idea of transnational law is to suggest that law has new sources, locations, and bases of authority. Addin "transnational" to "law" is like addin a question mark: queryin modern Western jurisprudence's state-centered understanding of law. It is also to query whether ideas and methods in international law need revising, to accelerate the ongoing development of this field away from its traditional focus on the relations of states, toward a broad concern with the regulatory problems of international society.
-3-Scholars, especially International Relations ("IR") scholars have identified structures of global governance beyond domestic legal institutions and the legalizing of international institutions as relevant objects of study when engaging with the topic of law in the international domain.
11 In these and other research projects there is often a separation between domestic (municipal) and International Law ("IL"), which is conceptually neat but unrealistic in the legal world. For example, Private International Law, which encompasses commercial disputes that cross national boundaries, is addressed in international dispute resolution institutions such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (e.g.
US -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp, 1998).
However, important cases with international implications are still being decided in domestic courts (Filanto Spa v Chilewich International, 1992; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 2013) . This paper follows other efforts to bridge the domestic and international in thinkin about law's relevancy. 12 Here there are opportunities to examine the various ways that law interacts with and impacts on the international, for example in "transnational communal networks," 13 global legal pluralist orders 14 and transnational legal orders.
15
One of the main concerns for IR scholars is why states comply with IL when there is no supra-national enforcement mechanism. As a legal domain where obligation and enforcement is uncertain, IL provides an opportunity to think about whether and how law exerts a "compliance 11 -5-by a single type of procedure and specialized courts with different types of judicial functions now feature in multiple jurisdictions. 26 The paper intermittently relies on examples of judges involved in the international domain.
These examples highlight the legal and political implications of judicial activities that are not decision-making per se. There are numerous sites where jud es en a e in or are 'active' in shaping law. For example, the domestic judiciary acting as a major branch of government currently features as the foundational thinking in Law and Development programs. 27 The World
Bank's website announces that Justice Systems Matter for Development. "Justice institutions are important in determining the extent to which these societal expectations are reali ed…" They have "specific instrumental roles" in "fosterin private sector rowth" and in "ensurin compliance of private sector actors and citi ens with le al and re ulatory frameworks." 28 Moreover, paradoxical visions of judges domestically and internationally point to a fundamental underlying self-doubt about law that is currently circulating in scholarship and the legal community. Judges and courts are thus sites of investigation in a project about whether legal norms are distinctive because they embody concerns about law as a tool for social change.
29
The third move is to shift the focus in thinking about distinctiveness of legal norms away from definitional perspectives to practice or interactional explanations. This is analogous to Robert Borofsky's recommendation to focus on social performance rather than merely on intellectual content in understanding knowledge. 30 Borofsky argues that to focus on content at [1999] [2000] . This has lead scholars to investigate the foundations of legal obli ation more enerally. See Brunn e & Toope 2010, 6 ("the key to understanding the role that law plays in international society lies in understanding the nature and operation in practice of le al obli ation."). Norm diffusion and international law theory has understandably proceeded in step with modern legal jurisprudence which moves beyond Austinian concepts of law. Law is not (merely) sovereign commands backed by threat of force. Rather, le al norms en ender a sense of obli ation because of law's le itimacy and the respect it carries. But then the question devolves into defining legitimacy. See Hurd 1999, at 381 (At its most basic, le itimacy relates to the "normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ou ht to be obeyed." This is a subjective, relational perception that shapes how the actor sees his or her interests); Keohane 1997, 491 (Le itimacy relates to criteria internal to the rule and "is related to the process by which it is created, its consistency with accepted eneral norms, and its perceived fairness or specificity"); and Slaughter 1997, 379 (It is the process throu h which law is "created, interpreted and applied" has distinctive effects on international behavior way that legal obligation can claim to be distinctive is to the extent that the criteria are internal to law. 56 Creating and applying law through processes which satisfy Fuller's criteria of le ality leads to a "practice of le ality" that generates fidelity and obligation. 57 Thus the distinctiveness for Finnemore, Toope and Brunn e stems from particular le al processes that adhere to principles of fairness and natural justice. Law is about process more than about form or product:
"Much of what le itimates law and distin uishes it from other forms of normativity are the processes by which it is created and applied -adherence to legal process values, the ability of actors to participate and feel their influence, and the use of legal forms of reasoning."
58

B. Moving away from Procedural Criteria
These procedural approaches to legal norms raise several problems, the answers to which suggest possible shifts in the object of study. First, there is still the concern of pairing IR theories with IL. At first blush, this is a natural pairing -'IR' and 'IL' scholars have a shared sense of the external environments they seek to explain and the problems that they are facin . They "see the same world outside their office windows"-a world of formal institutions, organizations, treaties but also a globalized world that is challenging both state sovereignty and relevance of formal state-based law. 59 The IR scholar's concern about whether IL is relevant to IR has a channeling effect and leads to a natural focus on obligation in absence of state authority (it therefore makes good sense to go to analytic jurisprudence post-Austin as a source for theories about legal obligation beyond threat of force). For example, the global rise of judicial review both in supra-national courts 62 and in constitutional courts resulting from constitutional reform in over eighty countries has affected a transfer of power to the judiciary and the creation of an international "juristocracy". 63 The movement of both public and private law legal norms (including court reforms, commercial codes, development of property systems) impacts on the institutional architecture of the state, shifting the allocation of authority between different state institutions.
64
The importance of looking at transnational spaces is discussed in greater depth in the next section. Suffice it to say here that once the IR/IL pair has been decoupled, we can return to My suggestion is that the construction and transnational flow of legal norms are places to look for clues about the distinctiveness of legal norms. In these transnational spaces, the concern is not the lack of a hierarchical state order to enforce legal obligations, but rather the plurality of 
B. Legal Transplants
"Legal transplants" refers to the movement and reception of a law between states. 86 The concept invokes the difficulties in the relationships between recipients/donors, diffusion/reception, and points to the mutually constitutive relationships between migratory and and economic resources into le al processes"). Scholars and academics articulate ideas that can be translated into the international arena; see e.g. local law. 87 The process of transplanting law emphasizes domestic differences, and studies have investigated reasons for acceptance and resistance in the movement of law, including differences in the types of legal transfers sometimes referred to as "or anic" versus "mechanical", 88 and le al families' or le al ori in theories. 89 Some of these studies have been critiqued for not accounting for "transplant effects" and subsequent institutional changes, for example in colonial territories. 90 The point to highlight here is that legal transplants must overcome obstacles in a new legal system and will be affected by processes for exporting and importing legal systems, the characteristics that inhere in the transplanted law itself, and the ability to graft onto existing legal norms and practices. 91 The relationships between donor and recipients suggest recurring themes in transnational law and legal movements. In particular, legal transplants highlight the places of competition, specifically criminal and administrative legal procedures. 96 Legal transplants of U.S. legal procedures stand as an example of both U.S. power to export legal models, but also the competition the U.S. faces in competing with other models and in on the ground translation.
97
The movement of law across borders is situated in a world of material, social and intellectual power which affects states' ability to shape discourse about legal norms and make certain legal norms available for transplant. However, legal transplants also point to choice of form, and processes of translation, resistance and modification. Legal ideologies influence processes of transplanting laws and often shape donor decisions on how to frame or package legal transplants.
The result of the movement of legal norms is often syncretic and polymorphic.
C. Choice and the "Compliance-Pull" of Reform
The 
IV. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND INDETERMINATE LEGAL ORDERS
A. Power and Politics
Dispute processing and social regulation occur in multiple locations, in institutions and organizations that draw on the symbols of law. order that was categorically similar and thus could be subjected to their own law; for the elites among the colonized, it opened up avenues toward reaffirming their own power." 128 In addition to highlighting ways that power was implicated in both legal and scholarly projects, legal pluralism became wrapped up in debates about cultural relativism versus the quest for a universal normative international legal order. 129 Legal pluralism in this context represented tolerance and acceptance, but it also advanced a poignant challenge to the le al order's stability by brin in into clear view law's contin ency.
Scholarship into legal pluralism has shifted from studying informal disputing to examine the ordering or regulation in non-state situations. 130 Scholars focus on the interconnectedness of social orders and the way that state law penetrates and restructures other normative orders. Legal pluralism focuses on "conceptuali in a more complex and interactive relationship between official and unofficial forms of orderin " to see the 'unofficial' forms as part of a plural legal order." 131 Law is no lon er the "exclusive artifact" of the nation state, but rather is produced by a diverse set of groups and communities that operate globally to structure and regulate behavior.
Various sectors of society, including multinational enterprises, labor, human rights and the internet, are "breakin the narrow frame of national law" and developin a lobal law in isolation from the state. 132 governance. 133 The research agenda melds together issues in legal pluralism, international political economy and techniques of control. As legal pluralism enters into the neoliberal arena, there is now a rowin sense that 'le al' and 'non-le al' forms of social re ulation "have always been part of the central make-up of le al theory." 134 A plurality of legal orders and a place for non-state norms is now 'common sense'. Legal pluralism "is no more a reality than legal centralism, but rather is merely another (though potentially superior) representation of legal reality." 
B. Recognition as Mode of Norm-Making
Current approaches to understanding legal pluralism move beyond the dichotomy between monist and pluralist concepts of law to emphasize that law is uniform and plural at the same time (Michaels) . In his discussion of a potential third paradigm for global legal pluralism, Ralf Michaels interestingly proposes that law has this propensity toward order and coherence even in the face of the blatant contingency that legal pluralism presents. Borrowing from systems theory about recursivity and stability, Michaels argues that legal pluralism's new direction would inquire into the ways that multiple orders create stability and mutual reinforcement:
Legal pluralism suggests a third dimension -how legal systems create, through recognition, other legal systems, and how the mutual recognition among legal systems in turn creates stability (or the illusion of it). Legal pluralism allows for a relativism of position. This is not the simple normative relativism (the recognition that norms may differ and the call for tolerance)… Instead, it is an epistemic relativism in which law is constructed -not only by communities for themselves, but especially by legal systems for each other.
138
Michaels advocates adopting the concept of recognition as "a practice of the reco ni in law" rather than understandin it as a rule or formal criterion for validity. "Reco nition, as a juridical cate ory, is thus analy ed as a practice, an anthropolo ical cate ory…" Similarly, David Kennedy suggests using legal pluralism as a method to uncover the gaps and biases, and the effects of "the rule of experts" and "their routine work" which denies them "the experience of discretion and responsibility and the rest of us the opportunity to challen e their action."
139
Shifting the focus to recognition as a practice opens up spaces to bring legal pluralism back to the 'le al centre', back to the state and courts, not as instantiation of a monist le al order, but rather as a site for investigating multiple practices. A focus on recognition also allows for an examination of the ways that domestic state courts now exhibit core themes of legal pluralismthe "irreducible plurality of le al orders in the world, the coexistence of domestic state law with 138 Michaels (2009), at 256. 139 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 652 ("Juxtaposin different professional sensibilities makes visible the limits, biases and blind spots of each… [and] sensiti es us to the ways in which our professional work responds more to our peculiar deformations professionals that to the world's most pressin problems." (emphasis in the original)) other legal orders, the absence of a hierarchically superior position transcending the differences."
140
Recognition as practice allows for an exploration into the boundaries of law by investigating interactions between and effects of multiple legal orders in addition to proving that multiple orders exist. Overlapping jurisdictional claims and indeterminate legal orders in global regulation suggest another important feature of legal norm-making. In these competitive and contingent legal spaces, legal actors and legal orders in a sense collaborate to mutually recognize and stabilize multiple coexisting legal systems.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGAL DISTINCTIVENESS?
The paper proposes that transnational legal processes and their modes of collaborative norm-making may be additional sites to learn about the ways that law achieves its 'stickiness.'
The relationships between donors and recipients of legal transplants suggest that in competitive and power infused legal spaces, syncretism and practices of translation are ways that legal actors collaborate to integrate legal norms. The persistence of indeterminate legal orders and the interactions between overlapping jurisdictional claims indicates that recognition as a practice may be another mode of collaborative norm-making which stabilizes legal norms.
But what does this have to tell us about the distinctiveness of legal norms? 141 Following on Merry's su estion to "study up", the paper concludes with some preliminary thou hts on knowledge practices in law and what the modes of collaborative norm-making in transnational le al processes have tell us about law's distinctiveness. 140 Michaels, supra note 44, at 244. 141 Brunée and Toope ultimately conclude that in order to understand how law operates to shape behavior, there needs to be an investigation into particular legal qualities: "it is not enou h to examine, as le al process scholars tend to do, 'the social mechanisms that help make international law matter' (Koh 2005: 977). Some of the potential of a constructivist approach to international law is lost unless we pay attention to both legal process and norm properties. Norms are thus 'counterfactually stabilised behavioural expectations' and they have unconditional validity independent of actual fulfillment or non-fulfillment. 152 In other words, the fact of whether the expectation is met or not met is not relevant. Stable normative expectations do not guarantee a particular future, but rather manage the unpredictability of the future, allowing for stability in the face of discrepant events. 153 Legal norms supervise this process, by creating counterfactual, disappointment-prepared and normative expectations.
154
Law provides 'security' in protectin expectations and "immunizing" society against a necessary risk. Law does this not only by positing a general statement of expectations that do not have to be adjusted, but also by justifying conduct retrospectively and then, for example in adjudication, by determining which party will need to adjust expectations (changing seemingly normative expectations to cognitive expectations). Legal systems provide structures that are both formally operational and that are able to track and record "patterns of hope, experience and decisions." 155 My sense is that legal norms are distinctive in their particular ability to combine past and present, practical and normative, skepticism and hope. of norms is not the projection of an ideal future but the projection of a 'mana ed' alternative to an unpredictable future"); , at 41 (an expectation that is not fulfilled has the dan er of revealin itself as havin only been an expectation, rather than fact. An un-fulfilled expectation "brin s into focus a ain the ori inal complexity of possibilities and the contin ency of also bein able to act differently"). 154 Luhmann, at 73 (law is the social system that supervises normative expectations in the temporal, social and material dimensions. Expectations are stabilised in the temporal dimension if the expectation and the event are symbolically isolated from each other. Expectations are institutionalized in the social dimension when norms are integrated into a consistent context of meaning that generates consensus. Expectations that are institutionalized in the social dimension are supported by the expected consensus of third parties. Finally, norms that are "fixed throu h identical meaning within the material dimension" can be reciprocally confirmed 
